Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can eliminate detector side channels and prevent all attacks on detectors. The future of MDI-QKD is a quantum network that provides service to many users over untrusted relay nodes. In a real quantum network, the losses of various channels are different and users are added and deleted over time. To adapt to these features, we propose a protocol that allows users to independently choose their optimal intensity settings to compensate for different channel losses. Such a protocol enables a scalable high-rate MDI-QKD network that can easily be applied for channels of different losses and allows users to be dynamically added/deleted at any time without affecting the performance of existing users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties to share a pair of random keys with unconditional security. However, while theoretically secure, practical QKD systems have detector side channels, which make them susceptible to attacks from hackers, making detectors the Achilles' Heel of QKD systems [1, 2] . The measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [3] protocol allows an untrusted third-party to make measurements, thus avoiding all security breaches from detector side channels.
MDI-QKD uses two channels between an untrusted relay Charles and each of Alice and
Bob. (Here in this work, we will focus on only discrete-variable MDI-QKD.) Since MDI-QKD depends on two-photon Hong-Ou-Mandel interference, its secure key rate heavily depends on the level of symmetry between the two channels, i.e., how close the two channel losses are [4, 5] . Previous experiments of MDI-QKD were either performed in the laboratory over symmetric fibre spools [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , or had to deliberately add a tailored length of fibre to the shorter channel (to introduce additional loss) in exchange for better symmetry [12] .
The future of MDI-QKD is to implement a MDI-QKD network -which, like a QKD network, allows many users to securely communicate simultaneously, but does not require trusted relays in the network, which is a huge advantage over traditional point-to-point QKD.
Field implementations of point-to-point QKD networks have been reported in e.g., Refs. [13] [14] [15] . Importantly, all these QKD networks require trusted relays between users that exchange the keys acquired from point-to-point QKD sessions with each user. Notably, Tang et al. [16] reported the first (and the only one to date) three-user star-shaped MDI-QKD network experiment in a metropolitan setting. However, the MDI-QKD network experiment also has the limitation of being only feasible for near-symmetrical channels. Using the parameter optimization algorithm in [17] , it chooses identical intensities and probabilities for all three users. However, this is only possible because the channels are nearly symmetric, and the key rate for such a protocol will degrade very quickly with an increased level of asymmetry between channels. (Note that, there have also been proposals for continuous variable (CV) MDI-QKD [18, 19] , which provides high key rate for short distances, but is typically limited to distances < 25km even when assuming a high detector efficiency of 98%.)
In a realistic setup, a quantum network will very likely have asymmetric channels due to different geographical locations of sites. For instance, the channel losses in Ref. [13, 14] FIG. 1. (a) Part of the QKD network setup from Ref. [13] . Here as an example, we focus on the five nodes with high asymmetry (Nodes A 1 , A 3 , A 4 , A 5 connected with A 2 , corresponding to nodes 1-5 in Ref. [13] ), where A 2 can be set up as an untrusted relay. We keep the same topology and redraw it as a star-shaped MDI-QKD network with four users connecting to a single untrusted relay. When performing MDI-QKD, all users need to accommodate for the longest channel (i.e. A 1 ) and add loss to their channels (e.g. extending to A 3 , A 4 , A 5 ), if previous protocols are used. (b) Ship-toship communication and ground-satellite communication, where the participants' distances to the detector are constantly changing, and the channels will thus have quickly varying asymmetry.
are largely different. Here we select 5 nodes from the Vienna QKD network [13] and show them in Fig. 1(a) , where the biggest difference between channels is as large as 66km. If we'd like to perform MDI-QKD over these locations, although one can add additional fibres to each channel to compensate for channel differences, users will have to accommodate for the lowest-transmittance channel -just like in "Liebig's barrel " -and have sub-optimal rate.
Moreover, in a scalable network with large number of dynamically added/deleted users, it is not practical to add fibres and maintain symmetry between each pair of users all the time.
Additionally, if one is to implement a MDI-QKD network over free-space between mobile platforms (e.g., satellite-based MDI-QKD [20] or maritime MDI-QKD between ships), the losses in channels are constantly changing, and the channels will often be highly asymmetric, as shown in Fig. 1(b) .
The key goal of the present paper is designing a software solution that enables high key generation rate in a general scalable MDI-QKD network with arbitrary losses for various channels. More concretely, we propose an asymmetric MDI-QKD protocol, which can provide as much as 79 times higher key rate than previous protocols [21] that were designed for symmetric channels. Moreover, it enables a much larger region of possible combinations of channels. For instance, even at a small data size of N = 10 11 (N is defined as the total number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob), one can generate a high secret key rate of R = 10
per pulse even through an extremely asymmetric channel pair of (0km, 90km) for (Alice's, Bob's) channels, whereas with previous protocols no key could be generated at all. This completely removes the requirement of symmetric channels in MDI-QKD.
So far, the optimal decoy state method for MDI-QKD is the 4-intensity protocol proposed by Zhou et al. [21] . In this protocol, Alice and Bob each uses three intensities {µ, ν, ω} in the X basis to perform decoy-state analysis [22] [23] [24] , and uses one signal intensity {s} in the Z basis to generate the secret key. Including the probabilities P for each intensity, the 4-intensity protocol uses the same set of 6 parameters for Alice and Bob:
[s, µ, ν, P s , P µ , P ν ].
The 4-intensity protocol can greatly improve MDI-QKD performance under limited data size. However, it limits its discussions to the symmetric case only (optimizing 6 parameters), which is suboptimal in an asymmetric setting.
In Appendix A we provide an intuitive illustration of why using prior protocols (with same parameters for Alice and Bob) and adding additional fibres to channels are suboptimal when channels are asymmetric, and how we can get better performance by using our new method -which we will describe in detail in the next section.
II. SEVEN-INTENSITY PROTOCOL
In this work, we show that it is possible to effectively compensate for channel asymmetry by adjusting Alice's and Bob's intensities in decoy-state MDI-QKD. Note that, our method proposed here is a general result (which is proven in Appendix B and C) that can be applied to any decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol with WCP source, for both asymptotic and finitesize cases. For practicality here, in the main text we will choose one concrete example, the 4-intensity protocol, and generalize it by allowing Alice and Bob to have independent intensities and probabilities. This enables a "7-intensity protocol" (with independent s, µ, ν for Alice and Bob, and the vacuum state ω = 0) in the asymmetric case. We need to use a total of 12 parameters for a full finite-size parameter optimization:
here we denote the parameters as a vector v, and when all devices and channel parameters (e.g. channel loss, misalignment, dark count rate, detector efficiency, etc.) are fixed, the key rate is a function of the intensities and probabilities R( v), and the question of intensity parameter optimization can be viewed as searching for:
where V is the search space for the parameters.
To provide a high key rate under finite-size effects, optimal choice of parameters is very important in implementing the protocol. However, the 7-intensity protocol has an extremely large parameter space of 12 dimensions, for which a brute-force search is next to impossible.
Therefore, to efficiently search over the parameters in reasonable time, a local search algorithm must be applied. But, as we will show here, an important characteristic of asymmetric MDI-QKD is its non-smooth key rate function R( v) with respect to the intensity parameters in v. This means that a straightforward local-search algorithm, such as previously proposed in [17] , will inevitably fail to find the optimal point.
Here we will present two important theoretical results for the key rate versus parameter function, and propose a method to circumvent the problem of non-smoothness and perform efficient and correct local search in parameter space. This method helps us overcome the biggest challenge in successfully implementing the 7-intensity protocol.
Firstly, we propose that there is an inherent symmetry constraint for the ratio of optimal decoy intensities, that Theorem I. for any arbitrary choice of device and channel parameters, the optimal decoy intensities µ 
Secondly, we make an important observation that, Theorem II. The key rate versus (µ A , µ B ) function, for any given ν A , ν B , is not smooth.
Both of these theorems result from the fact that the lower bound for single-photon yield,
, in decoy-state analysis (whose expression can be found in Ref. [4, 25] ) is a piecewise function that depends on whether
, where a boundary line
exists.
Theorem I states that, the optimal parameters for maximum key rate must be exactly on this boundary line, while Theorem II states that, the key rate does not have a continuous partial derivative with respect to µ A or µ B across this boundary line. This will cause the boundary line to behave like a sharp "ridge", on which the gradient is not defined. An illustration for this "ridge" can be seen in Fig. 2 . A rigorous proof for Theorems I and II can be found in Appendix D.
Using Theorems I and II it is possible to transform the coordinates of the search variables, and eliminate the non-smoothness of the key rate function. In Appendix E, we will describe how to perform efficiently an optimization of the parameters based on local-search to obtain a high secure key rate for our 7-intensity protocol. Our method allows extremely fast and highly accurate optimization for asymmetric MDI-QKD, and takes below 0.1s for each full local search (at any given distance) on a quad-core i7-4790k@4.0GHz PC. Such computing efficiency makes it possible for real-time optimization of intensities on-the-field, and also makes possible a dynamic MDI-QKD network that might add/delete new user nodes in real time. Table I , and N = 10 11 . (a) using a previous 4-intensity protocol, (b) using our 7-intensity protocol. As can be seen, while 4-intensity MDI-QKD is limited to only high-symmetry regions, using 7-intensity can greatly increase the applicable region of MDI-QKD, even in extremely asymmetric regions such as (L A , 0) where one channel has zero distance (point B). Moreover, we see that with 7-intensity protocol both L A , L B components of the gradient for key rate (red dotted arrow) are always negative, meaning that with 7-intensity protocol it is always optimal to only adjust the intensities, and never necessary to add any fibre, while for 4-intensity protocol, adding fibre (e.g. increasing L B at point C) will sometimes increase the rate. Right: Comparison of rate vs distance (Bob to Charles) for various fixed levels of mismatch
where η is the channel transmittance, (c) using 4-intensity protocol (d) using 7-intensity protocol.
As can be observed, the higher the mismatch, the more advantage 7-intensity protocol has (and only when the channels are symmetric will the two protocols perform identically). Data points from A1, A3, B1, B3 from Table II are also shown in the plots. TABLE II. Simulation results for asymmetric MDI-QKD with fixed channel mismatch, using parameters from Table I and N = 10 11 . For two scenarios: case A (10km, 60km) and case B (30km, 60km), A1 and B1 represent using the old 4-intensity protocol directly. A2 and B2 represent adding fibre to the shorter channel to match the longer channel, i.e. making the channels (60km, 60km). And A3, B3 represent using our new 7-intensity protocol without modifying the channels. As shown here, 7-intensity protocol always returns higher rate than both strategies using 4-intensity protocol. 
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III. SIMULATION RESULTS
Now, we can proceed to study behaviors of MDI-QKD under asymmetry with 7-intensity protocol and full parameter optimization. The asymptotic case of infinitely many data size (and an analytical understanding of the ideal infinite-decoy case) is discussed in the Appendices B and C, and its simulation results can be found in Fig.6 . For simplicity, in the main text we focus on the practical case of having finite data size. (Our finite-key analysis is described in more detail in Appendix F. Moreover, even though for simplicity in numerical simulations, we consider a standard error analysis, it is important to note that our theory is fully compatible with composable security. See Appendix F for discussions.)
Firstly, we consider the key rate for an arbitrary combination of (L A , L B ), and perform a simulation of key rate over all possible range of Alice and Bob's channels. This provides a bird's-eye view of how using 7-intensities can affect the performance in asymmetric channels. We show the results in Fig. 3 (a)(b) . From the plot we can make three important observations:
(1) Using 7-intensity protocol, we have a much wider applicable region for asymmetric MDI-QKD, and acceptable key rate can be acquired even for highly asymmetric channels.
In addition, 7-intensity protocol will always provide higher key rate, except when channels are already symmetric. (2) No matter what position one is at, there is never any necessity for adding loss when 7-intensity protocol is used, and optimizing on-the-spot always provides highest rate. Details can be seen in Fig. 3 caption.
(3) Using 7-intensity protocol, even extremely asymmetric scenarios, such as (L, 0) where L B = 0, can be used to generate a good key rate. In fact, this provides an even higher rate than with symmetric channels such as (L, L) (As the comparison between points A and B in Fig. 3 ).
Point 3 has an important practical implication: it can lead to a new type of "single-arm"
MDI-QKD setup. More details can be found in the Appendix G.
Here for Points 1-3, we have a good mathematical understanding of why allowing different intensities for Alice and Bob can provide a larger region where key rate is positive. We make the important observation that, for decoy-state MDI-QKD, the dependence of key rate on channel asymmetry in fact comes mainly from error-correction (which depends on the signal intensities), rather than privacy amplification (which depends on single-photon contributions estimated from decoy-state analysis). More specifically, when using WCP sources, the signal state QBER increases quickly with channel asymmetry, drastically reducing the key rate.
But by adjusting the different signal intensities for Alice and Bob, they can effectively compensate for the channel asymmetry, and keep the signal state QBER low. (Of course, the decoy-state intensities also need to be adjusted according the the asymmetry in order to accurately estimate single photon contributions, but the fundamental relation between key rate and asymmetry mainly comes from error-correction and the signal states.)
The above mentioned effect is present in both asymptotic and finite-key scenarios, and is the underlying reason that the 7-intensity protocol can allow high-rate MDI-QKD regardless of channel asymmetry. Additionally, we show that, when channels are highly asymmetric, the asymptotic key rate of the 7-intensity protocol scales quadratically with the lower transmittance among the two channels -which means that, albeit being able to provide higher key rate and being much more convenient than e.g. adding fibres when channels are asymmetric, the 7-intensity protocol will not change the asymptotic (quadratic) scaling properties of MDI-QKD key rate versus transmittance. More detailed discussions and analytical proofs of the above observations can be found in Appendices B and C. Now, as a concrete example, let us consider two sets of channels at (L B = 10km, L A = 60km) and (L B = 30km, L A = 60km), through which Alice and Bob would like to perform MDI-QKD. We compare strategies of using the 4-intensity protocol directly or with fibres added until channels are symmetric, with directly using our 7-intensity protocol. As can be seen in Table II , using 7-intensity protocol can sometimes provide as much as 79 times higher key rate, and it also always provides the highest rate compared to either strategies with 4-intensity protocol.
In fact, we can also show this by plotting key rate vs L B under a fixed mismatch (i.e.
fixed difference between L A and L B ). This is also the scenario studied by Ref. [4] . Results are shown in Fig. 3 (c) and (d). The data points A1/A3 and B1/B3 in Table II are also plotted. As can be seen, the higher the asymmetry between channels, the more improvement we can gain from using 7-intensity protocol.
Now, having demonstrated the new 7-intensity protocol, we proceed to introduce a powerful reality application for it: a scalable high-performance MDI-QKD network where any node can be dynamically added or deleted. We consider the channels from a real quantum network setup in Vienna, reported in Ref. [13] . We focus here on the high-asymmetry nodes, Fig. 1(a) . We found that our method leads to much higher key rates, and allows easy dynamic addition or deletion of nodes. Since intensities can be independently optimized for each pair of channels, the establishment of new connections does not affect any existing connections, hence providing good scalability for the network (compared to e.g. the case of using 4-intensity protocol with the strategy of adding fibres, where each channel needs to accomodate for the longest link among all channels). See Appendix H for numerical results.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have proposed a method of effectively compensating for channel asymmetry in MDI-QKD by adjusting the two users' intensities (with the 7-intensity protocol being a highly practical example that works well under finite-size effects). Such a method can drastically increase the scenarios MDI-QKD can be applied to while maintaining good key rate. This study provides a powerful and robust software solution for a scalable and reconfigurable MDI-QKD network. , to increase the symmetry in the channel, sometimes one adds additional loss to the system in Bob's lab [12] , in exchange for better symmetry. When estimating the key rate, Bob assumes that both Charles-Bob1 and Bob1-Bob2 channels are controlled by Eve. This is therefore a pessimistic estimation of key rate, and is not necessarily the optimal strategy.
In this section we provide an intuitive description of why adding additional loss is suboptimal, and how our method works better with asymmetric channels.
Previously, when Alice and Bob have asymmetric channels, a common solution is to add fibre (thus adding loss) to the shorter channel in exchange for better symmetry, such as in Ref. [12] . Afterwards one selects symmetric intensities for Alice and Bob and acquires higher rate. However, the added fibre lies in Bob's lab, and is in fact securely under control of Bob. But by assuming a symmetric setup, we are effectively relinquishing its control to Eve, and pessimistically estimating the key rate. Therefore, intuitively, this is not necessarily the optimal strategy. We will show with our new protocol that, when the channels are asymmetric, Alice and Bob can independently choose their optimal intensities, and that optimizing intensities and probabilities alone is sufficient to compensate for the different channel losses.
Appendix B: Scaling of Key Rate with Transmittance
In this section we discuss the scaling properties of key rate versus transmittance, for prior protocols with same parameters for Alice and Bob, and our new protocol that uses different intensities for Alice and Bob.
The transmittance of the two channels are (η A , η B ), and the asymmetry (mismatch) x is defined as
Now, let us consider a single-photon case first. That is, suppose Alice and Bob both send perfect single photons only, and the key is generated from two-photon interference. If we ignore the dark counts, the asymptotic key rate can be written as [26] :
where h 2 is the binary entropy function and e 11 is the QBER (which is a quantity that, when dark count rate is ignored, is independent of the transmittance). This means that in the perfect single-photon case, the key rate is proportional to η A η B , and the mismatch x does not explicitly appear in its expression:
In fact, for a given total distance L A + L B = L, any positioning of the untrusted relay
Charles (e.g. at the midpoint, in Alice's lab, or in Bob's lab) would not affect the key rate, since η A η B only depends on L.
Weak Coherent Pulse Source
The previous discussion for single-photon MDI-QKD suggests that, by nature, there is not really any asymmetric limitation on MDI-QKD, at least for the ideal single photon case.
Then, where does this dependence on channel symmetry which we observed come from? In this section, we will show that it comes from error-correction, when using WCP sources, rather than privacy amplification (which depends on single-photon contributions).
More concretely, (as we will prove in the next section) for protocols with symmetric intensities, there are two sharp cut-off values for the mismatch, x max and x min , that prevent the protocol from acquiring any key rate when x > x max or x < x min (and optimizing identical intensities s A = s B cannot circumvent this problem). This is why protocols such as 4-intensity protocol are limited to near-symmetric positions.
On the other hand, when a protocol allows independent intensities for Alice and Bob (such as our new 7-intensity protocol described in the main text), we show that the mismatch can always be compensated by optimizing intensities s A and s B (hence lifting the limitations x max and x min ). In fact, we show that for positions with high asymmetry, key rate no longer
at all, and the optimal key rate only scales with the smaller of the two channel transmittances. That is,
which means that, the biggest advantage of protocols with independent intensities for Alice and Bob (e.g. 7-intensity protocol) is to completely lift the limitation on channel asymmetry. When compared with adding fibre to maintain asymmetry, we see that its scaling property is still the same, i.e. quadratically related to the (smaller of) channel transmittances. Although, it will always perform better (by a constant coefficient) than adding fibre. Moreover, it provides the convenience of not needing additional fibre, which may not be feasible in free-space channels, or when channel mismatch is changing.
Proofs for the above scaling properties can be found in the next section.
In this section we outline the analytical proofs for the observations on the scaling properties of asymptotic MDI-QKD key rate versus transmittance, described in Appendix B. We also discuss how the finite-decoy and finite-size effects can be considered as imperfections in the infinite-decoy, infinite-data case, and that the scaling properties are still approximately the same.
To simplify the discussion, it is convenient to first use a few crucial approximations as described in Ref.
[4]:
1. We consider the asymptotic case with infinite data size. 3. We ignore the dark count rate Y 0 , when studying the scaling properties with distance (as background noise only affects the maximum transmission distance where transmittance is at the order of dark count rate, but does not affect the overall scaling properties of key rate versus distance).
4. When describing the channel model to estimate the observable gain and QBER Q Z ss and E Z ss (which affect the error-correction), we make second-order approximations to two functions:
where I 0 is the modified bessel function of the first kind. This approximation is relatively accurate when s A η A η d and s B η B η d are both small, where η d is the detector efficiency.
With the above approximations, one can write the key rate conveniently as (excerpting Eq. C.1 and C.2 from Ref. [4] ):
where G(x, s A , s B ) is a function determined by (s A , s B ) and the asymmetry x only:
where h 2 is the binary entropy function. Now, having described the key rate function, we are interested in how it scales with the transmittances η A , η B , using different optimization strategies for the intensities. We will discuss two cases:
1. R symmetric , where Alice and Bob use the same intensity s = s A = s B , and optimize s 2. R optimal , where Alice and Bob fully optimize a pair of intensities s A , s B , which can take different values.
Symmetrically Optimized Intensities
Let us consider the case where Alice and Bob use the same intensity s = s A = s B , and optimize s. This is the case discussed by previous protocols (such as the 4-intensity protocol, although here to simplify the proof we focus on infinite-decoy case and only consider signal intensities).
In this case, the function G is optimized over s (and is a function of x only). The rate
therefore, R symmetric is proportional to η 2 B when channel mismatch
is fixed.
Moreover, since R symmetric is also proportional to G(x), we will have R symmetric = 0 if G(x) = 0. Note that, we can rewrite the signal state QBER E Z ss as:
since the equal intensities are canceled out, i.e. E Z ss is only a function of x. In fact, E Z ss is a function that minimizes at x = 1 and reaches 50% (where R symmetric is naturally zero) when x → 0 or x → ∞. Therefore, if G(x) = 0 at x = 1, there must exist some critical values of x max and x min which result in a sufficiently large QBER such that G(x) = 0 (and
This means that, R symmetric is quadratically related to η B (or η A ) when mismatch
fixed, but also has two cut-off positions for critical levels of mismatch, beyond which no key can be generated. These two critical mismatch positions are what limit previous MDI-QKD protocols to near-symmetric positions. Also, as we have previously mentioned, we see that this critical dependence on mismatch actually comes from the error-correction part (which involves E Z ss ).
Fully Optimized Intensities
Now, let us consider the case where Alice and Bob are allowed to fully optimize their intensities s A , s B (such as in the 7-intensity protocol, although again, here we only focus on the infinite-decoy case).
In this case, the function G is optimized over s A , s B . The rate satisfies
Now, let us focus on the properties of G(x, s A , s B ). Looking at its expression in the previous section, we make the important observation that, except for the term e −(s A +s B ) in the privacy amplification, every other term is only a function of s B and xs A (rather than x and s A separately). We can re-write G(x, s A , s B ) as
where we define equivalent intensity s A as FIG. 5. Rate vs distance contours for single photon MDI-QKD R SP , decoy-state MDI-QKD with symmetric intensities R symmetric , and with fully optimized intensities R optimal . We plot the contour line of R = 10 −9.5 . Here for a better comparison with WCP sources, we arbitrarily set a probability P 11 = s A s B × e −(s A +s B ) (where s A = s B = 0.6533) of single photon pairs being sent when calculating R SP . For decoy-state case, as described in Appendix C, we assume infinite decoy states, infinite data size, ignore dark count rate, and take second-order approximation when calculating gain and QBER (so that we only focus on the ideal scaling properties of key rate with distance). As can be seen, R SP is not limited by asymmetry, and takes constant value for any fixed L AC + L BC (meaning that the dependence of key rate on asymmetry only comes from error-correction part when using WCP sources). For decoy-state MDI-QKD, we can clearly see R symmetric being limited by the two cut-off lines where |L AC − L BC | takes maximum value (which corresponds to critical values of channel mismatch x max and x min ). On the other hand, R optimal is not limited by asymmetry, and has contours nearly perpendicular to the axes when asymmetry is high (meaning that, when one channel is significantly longer than the other, R optimal is only dependent on the longer channel).
Moreover, if η A η B (i.e. mismatch x 1), we can approximately assume that
which means that we can rewrite max
which, importantly, is a constant value not dependent on the value of x. The actual value of s A equals
Physically, this means that, when there is asymmetry between Alice and Bob's channels, we can compensate for this asymmetry by adjusting the intensities, to keep the same "equivalent intensity" received by Charles and keep E Z ss at a low value. In this case, E Z ss is no longer limited by the mismatch x, and we can perform MDI-QKD at arbitrary values of asymmetry.
Also, the key rate is now given by:
This means that, when η A η B (e.g. the "single-arm" case previously mentioned where 
Therefore, overall,
Now, we plot the two cases (symmetric intensities and fully optimized intensities) in a contour plot. As we can observe in Fig.5 , the key rate R symmetric has two cut-off mismatch positions beyond which key rate is zero. This limitation is removed when full optimization of intensities is implemented. Moreover, for R optimal , we see that the contours are perpendicular to the axes in high asymmetry regions, which means that the key rate only scales with the longer of the two channels.
For near-symmetric regions, though, note that the contours are no longer perfect perpendicular lines, that is because
resulting in a lower key rate than the previous approximation. In the extreme case of x = 1, the key rate is the same as symmetric protocols.
Also, note that, here using fully optimized intensities we can generate high key rate at arbitrary positions. Compared with the practice of adding fibre, though, it has the same quadratic scaling property. But since
where the right hand side is where one adds loss to η A until η A = η B , our new protocol always provides higher key rate than adding fibre.
Practical Imperfections
Up to here we have analytically shown how choosing to fully optimize the intensities can affect the key rate, for the asymptotic, infinite-decoy case. Note that, here the behavior of contours as shown in Fig.5 is a result of s A , s B compensating for the difference in channel loss. Although, we have so far assumed perfect knowledge of single-photon contributions, and have not yet discussed the decoy-state intensities. Moreover, non-ideal experimental parameters (including dark count rate and detector efficiency), and finite-size effects will both affect the key rate. Here in this subsection, we compare the key rate under more practical assumptions, and show that the above factors can be considered as imperfections that reduce the key rate, but maintain similar contour shapes and scaling properties for the key rate -that is, we will still observe a high dependence on asymmetry for protocols with identical intensities for Alice and Bob, and fully optimizing intensities can completely lift this limitation.
In practice, with a finite number of decoys (for instance, for 4-intensity and 7-intensity protocols, where Alice and Bob choose respectively three decoy intensities, µ, ν, ω), the estimation of Y 11 and e 11 is not perfect, therefore the key rate will be slightly lower than the aforementioned infinite-decoy case. Moreover, to better estimate Y 11 and e 11 , the decoy intensities need to be optimized to compensate for channel loss, too. In general, they follow a similar rule of thumb as the signal intensities: the larger the loss in a channel, the stronger the decoy intensities in order to compensate for it. But note that, here the optimization of decoy intensities has a very different purpose from that of the signal intensities s A , s B -the signal intensities are optimized so as to reduce E Z ss and maximize the key rate, while the FIG. 6. Contours of rate vs distance for decoy-state MDI-QKD, under different assumptions for practical imperfections, for the key rates for asymptotic case with infinite decoys (and ideal assumption of zero dark count rate and 100% detector efficiency), asymptotic case with 4-intensity/7-intensity protocol, and finite-size case with 4-intensity/7-intensity protocol. Top: protocols with identical intensities for Alice and Bob, Bottom: protocols with fully optimized intensities. (Note that in the bottom plot there are some noises in the asymptotic 7-intensity protocol key rate. This is because the optimal ν can take a very small value in the ideal case where data size is infinitely large. This results in some numerical noises in computer simulations). We plot the contour lines of R = 10 −7 . As can be observed here, the finite number of decoys, the non-ideal experimental parameters, and the finite-size effects are all imperfections that reduce the key rate. However, the overall shapes of the contours still remain largely the same, which follow the upper bound given by the ideal infinite-decoy case. (Except for 4-intensity protocol under finite-size effect, which no longer has two clear cut-off mismatch positions, but is still severely limited by channel asymmetry, while 7-intensity protocol lifts this constraint completely).
decoy intensities are optimized to estimate Y L 11 and e U 11 as accurately as possible, whose ideal values Y 11 and e 11 (used in the infinite-decoy case above) provide an upper bound for the practical key rate with finite number of decoys. As we see in Fig.6 , the asymptotic key rate with a finite number of decoys follows a similar shape as its upper bound, the infinite-decoy case.
Additionally, the detector efficiency (which is equivalent to channel loss) contributes to a uniformly shifted key rate in both L AC and L BC directions, while dark counts reduce the key rate more significantly in the higher loss region (both of which we have ignored in the ideal case as described at the beginning of this section). However, as observed in Fig.6 , these factors do not change the overall shape of the contours either.
Lastly, finite-size effect will reduce the key rate significantly. As observed in Fig.6 bottom plot, while the key rate is reduced, the contour shapes remain largely unchanged (meaning that even under finite-size effect, the 7-intensity protocol can still effectively compensate for channel asymmetry effectively). In Fig.6 top plot, we can find similar observations, that finite-size effect reduces the overall key rate. Although, note that, under finite-size effect, the shapes of key rate contours for the 4-intensity protocol are somewhat different, and no longer follow the two cut-off positions x upper , x lower for channel mismatch (which appear as straight lines in the Rate vs L AC , L BC plot). This is because, though the key rate is still limited by E Z ss (which causes the cut-off mismatch positions), it is also limited by the estimation of Y L 11 and e U 11 using the decoy states. Compared to the asymptotic case, here under finite-size effect, the increased e U 11 is likely a more severe limiting factor than E Z ss , and not being able to choose independent intensities for Alice and Bob prevents an accurate estimation of Y L 11 and e U 11 . Therefore, here the dependence of key rate on channel asymmetry is present in both privacy amplification and error-correction terms, and the shapes of contours are a result of both effects. (The difference in contour shape from the infinite-decoy case is more prominent for finite-size case, likely because the key rate is more sensitive to e U 11 here). Importantly, under finite-size effects, the key rate for 4-intensity protocol is still highly limited by channel asymmetry, while 7-intensity protocol completely removes such a constraint and allows two channels with arbitrary asymmetry between them.
Appendix D: Decoy State Intensities
In this section we will described Theorems I and II in more detail, and show their theoretical proofs in the asymptotic limit of infinite data size (Moreover, numerically, we found that Theorems I and II in fact hold true even under finite-size effects). 
("case 2").
Allowed regions are marked in color for either cases. In case 1, we show that
< 0, so any given point A can descend along µ B axis (the solid black arrow) to get higher rate, until it reaches boundary line
where µ B is highest. Similarly, in case 2, is not smooth.
Symmetry of Optimal Decoy Intensities
To prove Theorem I, here we will actually propose an even stronger assumption for µ A , µ B :
Theorem III. for any arbitrary choice of device and channel parameters, and any two given values of ν A , ν B , the optimal decoy intensities µ opt A , µ opt B that maximize R always satisfy the constraint:
Remark: as will be shown below, Theorem I is simply a corollary from Theorem III.
Proof for Theorem III: Here for convenience, we first limit the discussion to asymptotic case (i.e. infinite data size), and we assume that the vacuum intensity is indeed ω = 0.
Throughout the rest of the text, we will use Q k ij and E k ij to denote the observed gain and QBER, where, if not specified, the first subscript is Alice's intensity, and the second is Bob's intensity, which can be chosen from {s A , µ A , ν A , ω} and {s B , µ B , ν B , ω} for Alice and Bob, respectively. The superscript k signifies the basis X or Z (although, here we only explicitly write the basis for illustration purposes, since the basis is already implied by the choice of intensities).
First, looking at the key rate expression [3, 21] :
we can see that only the term Y X,L
11 )], i.e. the decoy-state analysis and privacy amplification, is determined by the decoy intensities (and probabilities, if finite-size effect is considered) only, and not affected by the signal intensities s A , s B . This is an important and very convenient characteristic of the 4-intensity/7-intensity protocol, that the signal state is only concerned with key generation, while the decoy states are only responsible for privacy amplification. That is, the optimization of decoy-state intensities is decoupled from the key generation. Now, we can make an observation that, under given device parameters and channel loss, the optimization of the decoy intensities is independent of s A , s B , and its only goal is to maximize Y X,L
Furthermore, to perform the decoy state analysis, we note that the upper bound for single-photon QBER satisfies the form of:
where e
X,U 11
is only determined by Y X,L 11 , ν A and ν B . The full expression, as in [4] , is listed below:
. Now, suppose we first fix two arbitrary values of ν A , ν B , and try to maximize Y 
is that, its expression is dependent upon whether
, i.e. it is a piecewise function, as described in Ref. [4] :
Case 2: otherwise, if
where we denote the two expressions of Y Now, we can make a key observation, that in case 1, for any given µ A , the partial derivative , so the only optimal case is to take the boundary condition
This means that, in the region of
, any two optimal value pair (µ , or else we can always decrease µ B to get a higher rate, meaning that the previous point is not the actual maximum. We illustrate this behavior in Fig.7 .
Similarly, for case 2, the partial derivative with respect to µ A satisfies
In the same way, in case 2 for any given µ B , we can acquire:
Up to here, we have proven that Theorem III is indeed correct.
Proof for Theorem I: Now, following the same idea, any four optimal value pair , or else we can always vary (µ A , µ B ) while keeping (ν A , ν B ) fixed, and let
to get a higher rate, meaning that the previous point is not the actual maximum. Therefore, we have shown that Theorem I is indeed correct, that the optimal decoy intensities always satisfy
Note that the same conclusion doesn't hold true for traditional 3-intensity MDI-QKD (i.e. using {µ, ν, ω} for both X and Z basis and using µ in Z basis to generate the key), that is because the key rate for 3-intensity depends on µ for both key generation and errorcorrection, such that Q Z µµ , E Z µµ terms and the single-photon probability µe −µ both depend on µ, hence optimizing only Y L 11 is no longer sufficient. Therefore, this independence of s from µ, ν is an additional advantage that the 4-intensity/7-intensity protocol can provide, under asymmetric conditions. Also, one thing to note is that, although the above theorem provides us with a way to
, the actual values of these ratios still need to be found by optimization. In Ref. [4] , the authors have proposed a rule-of-thumb formula for finding optimal intensities:
However, this is only a rather crude approximation, and only holds true when the dark count rate Y 0 is ignored, and infinite number of decoys are used (suppose µ is the signal intensity). For a general case, µ A /µ B is not always equal to η B /η A (and does not only depend on the mismatch x = η A /η B ) but rather fluctuates significantly when (η A , η B ) changes. But at least, one general rule is that µ A /µ B decreases with x = η A /η B , or, to put in more simple words, the larger the channel loss, the higher the intensities we should choose to compensate for the loss.
Non-smoothness of Key Rate vs Intensities Function
In the previous section we have shown that the piecewise expression for Y X,L 11 causes the optimal value to occur on the boundary line
Here we continue to show that Theorem II is a result of this piecewise function, too.
Proof of Theorem II:
The theorem means that, the key rate does not have a continuous First, we rewrite Y 11 into:
The last term is not dependent on either µ A or µ B . Note that, here on the boundary of
, the values of Y 
Performing the partial differentiation against µ A , we can get:
We can see that, on the boundary of
, the first terms are again equal, however, the second term in vs µ A on the two sides of the "ridge" are not equal, causing the rate function R to be non-smooth. A similar proof can be applied to µ B and it leads to the same result.
An illustration can be seen in main text Fig. 2 , which chooses a given set of values (ν A = 0.2, ν B = 0.1) and plots the key rate over (µ A , µ B ). As can be clearly observed, there is a sharp ridge on the line
= 2, meaning the key rate function versus intensities is not smooth.
Proof of Negativity of Partial Derivatives for Decoy Intensities
As described above, the expression for the single-photon yield, Y X,L 11 depends on whether
, we would like to prove that Lemma I: Proof of Lemma I: Here, we use a simplified model of the Gain Q X ij as in Ref. [4] , which ignores the dark count rate Y 0 , and takes a second-order approximation for the modified Bessel function:
where η B is the transmittance in Bob-Charles channel,
is the channel mismatch, η d is the detector efficiency, and e d is the misalignment. Here for convenience we can further
such that
Now, let us consider
To calculate the single-photon gain, the two terms:
are linear combinations of the observable Gains Q Z ij .
We can make the observation that, only the term
contains µ B , so, we only need to prove the positivity of
), where
substituting with Eq. D20,
Therefore,
note that here, as µ A , µ B > 0, we have e µ A , e µ B > 1, and each of the three functions satisfy
Therefore, we have proven that
) > 0 and that Proof of Lemma II:
On the boundary of
, the first terms are equal, i.e.
However, here we have to show that the second term in
is strictly larger than zero:
Just like in Appendix D.3, we can expand the gain Q X ij using Eq. D20:
Subtracting them, we can acquire:
Note that, when a given variable x > 0, the functions
Therefore, these three functions strictly increase with their variable x, i.e. for any
. Now, we can use the conditions µ A > ν A , µ B > ν B , and acquire:
Similarly, one can show that
Therefore, for any given intensities (ν A , ν B ), the rate function R(µ A , µ B ) is not smooth against the two intensities (µ A , µ B ).
Remark: Also, though not explicitly proven here -since ν A , ν B will affect not only Y X,L
11 , but will affect e X,U 11 too, their derivatives will be a lot more complex than µ A , µ B -numerically we observed that for any given (µ A , µ B ), the rate function R(ν A , ν B ) is actually not smooth against the two intensities (ν A , ν B ) either, and the ridge still appears at
Appendix E: Local Search Algorithm
In this section we describe how to perform the optimization for the parameters, which is an indispensable process in obtaining the optimal key rate.
To provide a good key rate under finite-size effects, optimal choice of parameters is an extremely important factor in implementing the protocol. However, the 7-intensity protocol has an extremely large parameter space of 12 dimensions, for which a brute-force search is next to impossible. To put into context, a desktop PC (quad-core i7-4790k@4.0GHz) can evaluate the function R( v) at approximately 10 5 parameter combinations v per second.
But searching over a very crude 10-sample resolution for each parameter would take over 4 months, and a 100-sample resolution for each parameter would take 3 × 10 11 years, a time longer than the age of the universe! Therefore, a local search algorithm must be used to efficiently search the parameters in reasonable time.
Here we start by adopting a local search algorithm for parameter optimization, proposed in Ref. [17] , called "coordinate descent" (CD), which requires drastically less time than using an exhaustive search. Instead of performing an exhaustive search over the parameter space, we can descend along each axis at a time, and iterate over each axis in turn. For instance, suppose we currently iterate s A :
which freezes the other coordinates, and replaces s A with the optimal position on the current coordinate-axis s A . In the next iteration the algorithm will descent along axis µ A , etc., hence the name coordinate descent. The search space satisfies that: the probabilities lie within (0, 1), and while the intensities could be in principle larger than 1, typically that doesn't provide a good key rate, so here we also define the domain for all intensities as (0, 1). The decoy intensities also follow two additional constraints µ A > ν A and µ B > ν B . The CD algorithm is able to reach the same optimal position as a gradient descent algorithm (with descends along the gradient vector), the commonly used approach for parameter optimization.
However, a significant limitation of coordinate descent is that it does not work correctly over functions that are non-smooth. For instance, in the presence of a sharp "ridge" as in Fig.2 in the main text, any arbitrary point P on the ridge will cause the CD algorithm to terminate incorrectly and fail to find the maximum point. Mathematically, this is caused by the gradient not clearly defined on a non-smooth position. Therefore, coordinate descent does not work anymore for asymmetric MDI-QKD.
As we discussed above, the non-smoothness comes from the "ridge",
. Moreover, we know that the optimal parameters must satisfy
. Therefore, here we propose to use polar coordinate instead of Cartesian coordinate to perform coordinate descent, and
. In this way, we can make the rate vs parameter function smooth.
We redefine v as:
where
In this way, the expression of Y L 11 always takes the boundary value (and only has a single expression). Therefore, when other parameters are fixed, R(θ µν ) is actually a smooth func-tion, therefore by searching over the parameters v polar , we can successfully find the optimal parameters and maximum rate.
After converting to polar coordinates and jointly searching θ µν , the coordinate descent algorithms becomes:
Appendix F: Finite Size analysis
In this section we describe the finite-key analysis used in our simulations.
The analytical proofs in Appendix D are shown for the asymptotic case. Numerically we show that 7-intensity protocol works effectively in the finite-key regime too, as can be observed in main text Fig. 3 .
To account for finite-size effects, we perform a standard error analysis [17, 21] , and estimate the expected value n of an observable n by
where we define the upper and lower bound for an observable n as n and n. Here, γ is the number of standard deviations the confidence interval of the observed value is from the expected value (for instance, for a required failure probability of no more than = 10 −7 , we should set γ = 5.3).
We can denote the observed counts as n
, and error counts as m
, where µ i ∈ {µ A , ν A , ω}, µ j ∈ {µ B , ν B , ω}. Then, the observed gain and error can be acquired from:
where N is the total number of signals sent, and P µ i , P µ j are the probabilities for Alice and
Bob to send the respective intensities. Note that here we define the QBER in terms of error-gains:
As described in Appendix D, we can define the key rate expression as [3, 21] :
and the single-photon gain and error estimated by [4] :
µµ are linear combination terms of the observables
Now, with standard error analysis, we can define the upper and lower bounds for the gain and error-gain:
Therefore, we have
which we can use to substitute into Eq. F4 to obtain the key rate under finite-size effects. [21] . Here we compare the traditional 3-intensity protocol as proposed in Ref. [17] (red solid line), and the 4-intensity protocol [21] with independent-bound (blue solid line) and joint-bound analysis (blue dot-dash line).
Note that, in Ref. [21] , in addition to proposing the 4-intensity protocol, Zhou et al. has
proposed a "joint-bounds" finite-key analysis which jointly considers the statistical fluctuations of observable Gain and QBER. It is a tighter bound and can provide higher rate than considering each observable's fluctuations independently as we've discussed above in this section (i.e. using "independent-bounds"). To illustrate this, we perform a simple simulation of key rate versus distance plot, using independent-bounds and joint-bounds (as well as using traditional 3-intensity protocol [17] for comparison). As can be seen in Fig.8 , 4-intensity protocol with joint-bounds analysis provides higher rate than independent-bounds (and both have higher rate than the 3-intensity protocol).
However, joint-bound analysis is based on linear optimization and sometimes brings multiple maxima for R( v), which is undesirable for local search, and will result in unpredictable behaviors (such as sudden "jitters" in the resulting rate vs distance plot, as can be observed in the joint-bound plot in Fig.8 . Similar behavior is observed in Ref. [21] too). Therefore, as the purpose of this work is studying asymmetric MDI-QKD, we will focus on independentbounds here.
Also, note that although we have used standard error-analysis for simplicity, our method here can in principle be applied to finite-key analysis with composable security, too, such as using Chernoff bound [27] . The key point is that (as explicitly demonstrated in Appendices B and C), the dependence of MDI-QKD key rate on channel asymmetry mainly comes from error-correction (and in the ideal asymptotic limit with infinite data and infinite decoys, the dependence of key rate on asymmetry only comes from error-correction). Therefore, by choosing different signal intensities, we can effectively compensate for asymmetry in the error correction term (specifically E Z ss ) and acquire good key rate. This effect is independent of the privacy amplification term, which contains estimations of single photon contribution that depend on whether we are considering the asymptotic case, or using a specific finite-key analysis. Adopting different finite-key analysis (or no analysis at all, as in asymptotic case) affects the bounds on single photon gain and QBER Y for the finite-size key rate. Therefore, the finite-size case can be seen as the asymptotic case with correction terms (i.e. imperfections) added to the privacy amplification. And just like the asymptotic case, the finite-size key rate for 7-intensity protocol will demonstrate a similar independence of channel asymmetry (as a result of optimized signal intensities for error-correction).
Appendix G: Single-Arm MDI-QKD
In the main text we have proposed a new type of "single-arm" MDI-QKD setup, which is the extremely asymmetric case where one channel has high loss while the other channel has close to zero loss. In this section we will describe it in more detail and outline its potential applications.
Suppose we have one crucial channel (e.g. a free-space channel, say in a satellite-ground connection, or a ship-to-ship connection) through which we would like to send quantum Table I , and set N = 10 11 . The three lines are generated using 4-intensity and adding fibre until L A = L B (black solid line), using 4-intensity but without being able to add fibre (black dashed line), and using 7-intensities directly (red dot-dash line). As can be seen, using 7-intensity tremendously increases the key rate and maximum distance for the long single-arm. At R = 10 −7 , using 7-intensity (having maximum distance at 90km) increases maximum distance by 17.5 or 33.2km (or, 3.5 to 6.6dB of loss) compared to 4-intensity with/without fibre, respectively. signals. We would like to prevent all attacks on the detector and improve the security with MDI-QKD, but cannot add a third party in the middle of the free-space channel. In this case, it is possible to add another source Bob in the laboratory (alongside the detector, with as small loss as possible in Bob-Charles channel), and use it to interfere with signal coming from Alice over the longer free-space channel, as shown in Fig.9 . With 7-intensity protocol, high key rate can be generated from this extremely asymmetric case, providing the security of MDI-QKD to a single channel where relays cannot be added while still maintaining good performance.
If one uses 4-intensity protocol, Bob has to add a fibre similar in loss to that of the freespace channel (to maintain the symmetry), while as we've shown with 7-intensity protocol, Bob can simply choose as small a loss as possible, and obtain maximum acceptable loss in Alice's channel. Not only does 7-intensity protocol make such a highly asymmetric MDI-QKD possible, it actually provides a higher rate compared to the symmetric case (if Bob adds a fibre). Moreover, since Alice's channel loss might be constantly changing, it can be very difficult to adjust an added fibre and maintain the symmetry, thus the convenience of not having to add any loss with 7-intensity protocol is a significant factor, too.
As we can observe in main text Fig. 3(a)(b) , for the same required minimum rate, rather than performing an experiment at (L max , L max ), if we are free to adjust one channel (and want maximum distance in the other channel), we can set the shorter channel to zero, and obtain a longer distance in the other channel, e.g. (L max , 0) with L max > L max . For instance, in main text Fig. 3(a)(b) , choosing point B(102km, 0km) can extend the longer arm from 85km to 102km, from the symmetric point A(85km, 85km) for the same R = 10 −10 .
Here we list the simulations results for single-arm MDI-QKD. To demonstrate the advantage, here we study three-cases: using 4-intensity (but being able to add fibre until channels are symmetric), using 4-intensity (however, due to being e.g. in a free-space channel or a dynamic network, without the luxury to add fibres and compensate for the channels), and using 7-intensity directly on the asymmetric channels. As can be seen in Fig.10 , 7-intensity protocol provides better performance that both strategies using 4-intensity, and increases maximum distance from 56.8km and 72.5km (respectively for adding/not adding fibre) to 90km. Thus, our new protocol can enable a unique new application of providing the security of MDI-QKD to a single channel where relays cannot be added (e.g. a free-space link), while still maintaining high key rate.
Appendix H: MDI-QKD Network Numerical Results
In this section we consider the channels from a real quantum network setup in Vienna, reported in Ref. [13] , and numerically show that using 7-intensity protocol can provide high-rate communication between each pair of users, while previous protocols either fail to establish some connections in the network, or suffer from low key rate for all connections. Table I , N = 10 11 , and channels in main text Fig. 1(a) . As can be seen, using 7-intensity protocol always provides higher rate than either using 4-intensity directly (which fails to establish some connections) or using 4-intensity after adding fibre to each channel to accommodate the longest channel (which results in identical low rates for every connectionsince every channel equals the longest channel after adding fibre). 7-intensity protocol therefore enables high scalability and reconfigurability because each link is independent of other links and no added fibre is needed. Here, we focus here on the high-asymmetry nodes in Ref. [13] , A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 , A 5 , plotted
Method
in main text Fig. 1(a) . The topology here is a commonly studied model of a star-type network, which is considered for QKD network in [28, 29] , and is also the model for the MDI-QKD network experiment in Ref. [16] . Such a network can provide a complete graph of connections between any two users, but only requires one physical connection from each user.
We show the simulation results in Table III , where using 7-intensity consistently provides high-rate connections even for nodes with very high asymmetry, and maintains the same (in fact moderately higher) key rate for nodes that are near-symmetric, i.e. including a long channel doesn't affect the rate between pairs of existing shorter channels.
Being able to establish connections with arbitrarily placed new nodes without affecting existing nodes is a very important property for a protocol to be used in a scalable and reconfigurable network, whose links will obviously be, more often than not, asymmetric. For the 4-intensity protocol, to accommodate the highest-loss channel, all connections will suffer from non-optimal key rate. Moreover, since new users might be added/deleted dynamically, such adding-fibre strategy will have poor scalability, since each new node affects the performance of all existing nodes, and also causes interruption of service when users update their fibres. With 7-intensity protocol, we are completely free of the worries of asymmetry, and can directly use the protocol on any channel combination optimally, so each node can be added/deleted without affecting the rest. This greatly improves not only the key rate, but also the scalability of a MDI-QKD network.
